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INTRODUCTION 
Ronald Regan once said, “[t]he nine most terrifying words in the 
English language are, ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help.’”2  
Unfortunately, this is a lesson that many learned in a very harsh way 
when the federal government squeezed out private stockholders of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by amending the terms of superior, 
Treasury-owned government stock in those entities. 
This Article presents the facts surrounding the bevy of lawsuits3 
filed in mid-2013, and analyzes the claims asserted therein, against the 
federal government for its attempt to siphon off all of Fannie Mae’s and 
Freddie Mac’s profits with the purported purpose of shuttering the 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Ronald Regan Quotes, THE QUOTATIONS PAGE, 
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Ronald_Reagan/21 (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
 3. See infra note 132. 
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entities.  In doing so, this Article begins by providing a brief history of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Part I.  Then, Part II explains the 
benefits and costs of obtaining a loan through these entities, as opposed 
to using an institution that the government did not charter.  Next, Part III 
explains the growing and popping of the housing bubble and the 
government’s reaction: the creation of various entities and 
implementation of agency actions that are the subject of the lawsuits at 
issue.  Part IV analyzes the claims that the investors assert against these 
governmental entities involved in this controversy.  Finally, Part V 
briefly discusses how the government answered the complaints in court. 
I. A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 
Before delving into the analysis of the claims asserted against the 
U.S. government, it is necessary to provide a brief background on these 
two government behemoths, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and how 
they were impacted by the 2008 housing crisis.  While this history 
provided herein is by no means a complete primer on the events 
surrounding the housing bubble and its subsequent pop, it sufficiently 
provides the reader with a working understanding in order to illustrate 
how the housing giants and private investors wound up in their current 
situation. 
A. FANNIE MAE 
Fannie Mae’s roots can be traced back to October 29, 1929, known 
as “Black Tuesday,”4 the unofficial beginning of the Great Depression in 
the United States.5  During this time, “[t]here was a big decline in house 
prices . . . and a large increase in mortgage foreclosure rates.”6  In the 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See October 29, 1929: “Black Tuesday,” CNN.COM (Mar. 10, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/10/sprj.80.1929.crash/.   “After an initial downturn on 
October 24, [1929], . . . the market plummeted in two days of panic—on October 28, 
 . . . and October 29, ‘Black Tuesday,’ the day it completely collapsed.” Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. David Wheelock, The Great Depression Q&A, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. 
LOUIS, http://www.stlouisfed.org/great-depression/qa.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2013) 
(drawing a distinction between the housing market during the Great Depression and 
during the 2008 housing crisis). 
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federal government’s attempt to stymie the Great Depression’s 
detrimental effects on homes and homeowners, the National Housing 
Act of 1934 (“NHA”)7 was passed.8  Particularly, Title III of the NHA9 
authorized the creation of the Federal National Mortgage Association,10 
which has become known as Fannie Mae.11  Congress officially charted 
Fannie Mae in 1938,12 which was initially established to “issue[] bonds 
to raise funds for the purchase of FHA-insured mortgages and, 
beginning in 1948, Veteran’s Administration (VA)-guaranteed 
mortgages.”13  It was, however, reorganized into a for-profit corporation 
in 1968.14  Operating in this form, private entities are permitted to 
purchase stock in the government-chartered corporations.15 
As currently codified, the purpose of the NHA and Fannie Mae is 
to facilitate a “secondary market . . . for residential mortgages”16 by: 
                                                                                                                 
 7. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 1716-17 (2012)). 
 8. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage 
Instruments:  The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1080–83 
(2007) (discussing the formation and evolution of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); HUD 
Historical Background, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., http://www.hud.gov/ 
offices/adm/about/admguide/history.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2013) [hereinafter HUD 
Historical Background]. 
 9. Kenneth G. Lore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Multifamily Financing, in 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING 2013, at 3 (2013). 
 10. See HUD Historical Background, supra note 8. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint ¶ 33, Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United 
States, No. 1:13-cv-01053-RLW (D.D.C. July 10, 2013) [hereinafter Fairholme Funds 
D.D.C Complaint]. 
 13. Forrester, supra note 8, at 1081 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 36,201 (Sept. 14, 1978)). 
 14. See id. at 1080–81. 
 15. See id.; see also Class Action Complaint ¶ 29, Cacciapalle v. United States, No. 
13-cv-00466 (Fed. Cl. July 10, 2013) [hereinafter Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint] 
(stating that “[f]rom 1968 until the [the federal government amended the Preferred 
Government Stock in 2012,] Fannie Mae has been publically traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange and therefore owned by private shareholders and has obtained funding 
from private capital on a self-sustaining basis”).  Fannie Mae stock trades under the 
stock symbol “FNMA.” See Fannie Mae, MARKETWATCH.COM, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing /stock/fnma (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).  This 
hybrid nature of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is at the heart of these complaints. See 
discussion infra Part IV. 
 16. 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2012). 
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(1) provid[ing] stability in the secondary market for residential 
mortgages; 
(2) respond[ing] appropriately to the private capital market; 
(3) provid[ing] ongoing assistance to the secondary market for 
residential mortgages (including activities relating to mortgages on 
housing for low- and moderate-income families involving a 
reasonable economic return that may be less than the return earned 
on other activities) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage 
investments and improving the distribution of investment capital 
available for residential mortgage financing; 
(4) promot[ing] access to mortgage credit throughout the 
nation (including central cities, rural areas, and underserved areas) 
by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving 
the distribution of investment capital available for residential 
mortgage financing; and 
(5) manag[ing] and liquidat[ing] federally owned mortgage 
portfolios in an orderly manner, with a minimum of adverse effect 
upon the residential mortgage market and minimum loss to the 
Federal Government.17 
 
Briefly stated, a secondary housing market is created by the 
following process.  First, individual lenders18 make residential home 
loans to borrowers19 that are secured20 by the homes.21  These mortgages 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. The lender in a secured transaction is considered a “secured party,” which is an 
entity “in whose favor a security interest is created.” U.C.C. § 9-102(72) (2010). 
 19. The borrower is termed the “debtor,” which is defined as “a person having an 
interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral.” U.C.C. § 9-
102(28). 
 20. A “secured transaction” is defined as a “business arrangement by which a 
buyer or borrower gives collateral to the seller or lender to guarantee payment of an 
obligation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (9th ed. 2009). 
 21. See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A RESPONSIBLE MARKET FOR HOUSING FINANCE 
1 (2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/01/pdf/ 
responsiblemarketforhousingfinance.pdf. 
The secondary market for mortgages encourages the flow of 
mortgage capital directly by replenishing the lending funds of 
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are then purchased and pooled together by the secondary lender.22  
Through a process of securitization, these pools of loans are 
subsequently “packaged into mortgage-backed securities . . . [and] sold 
to investors.”23  When being securitized, these mortgaged-backed 
securities are “converted . . . into more liquid, flexible instruments,”24 
such as bonds, and are then issued to investors globally.25  “The 
investors in these mortgage-backed securities will be paid from the 
principal and interest payments flowing into the pool from the 
mortgages.”26 
Fannie Mae purchases both single-family and multi-family 
residences for the secondary market.27  Through the third quarter of 
2013, Fannie Mae has paid $105.3 billion to taxpayers and made 3.1 
million home purchase loans.28 
                                                                                                                 
mortgage originators almost immediately rather than over thirty 
years of repayments.  A secondary market for mortgages also 
indirectly encourages increased real estate capital by (a) matching up 
the cost of lending capital to loan returns and (b) spreading risks 
borne by a mortgage lender. 
Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences:  The Role and 
Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1495–96 (2011). 
 22. See Boyack, supra note 21, at 1501–02. 
 23. Id.  A “commercial mortgage-backed security” may be defined as “[s]ecurities 
collateralized by a pool of mortgages on commercial real estate in which all principal 
and interest from the mortgages flow to certificate holders in a defined sequence or 
manner.” BAXTER DUNAWAY, LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 56:1 (2013).  
Securitization may generally be defined as the “conver[sion] ([of] assets) into 
negotiable securities for resale in the financial market, allowing the issuing financial 
institution to remove assets from its books, and thereby improve its capital ratio and 
liquidity, and to make new loans with the security proceeds if it so chooses.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (9th ed. 2009).  Essentially, this occurs when the Companies 
pool the mortgages and issue mortgage-back securities. 
 24. FANNIE MAE, BASICS OF FANNIE MAE SINGLE-FAMILY MBS 1 (2013), available 
at http://fanniemae.com/resources/file/mbs/pdf/basics-sf-mbs.pdf. 
 25. See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble & the 
Resulting Credit Crisis:  A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 126 (2009). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See generally FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 
2013). 
 28. See 2013 Progress Report, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/ 
progress/index.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
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B. FREDDIE MAC 
Freddie Mac followed a somewhat similar path as Fannie Mae, 
albeit several decades later.29  Congress passed the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation Act in 197030 in order: 
 
(1) to provide stability in the secondary market for residential 
mortgages; 
(2)  to respond appropriately to the private capital market; 
(3) to provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market for 
residential mortgages (including activities relating to mortgages on 
housing for low- and moderate-income families involving a 
reasonable economic return that may be less than the return earned 
on other activities) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage 
investments and improving the distribution of investment capital 
available for residential mortgage financing; and 
(4) to promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation 
(including central cities, rural areas, and underserved areas) by 
increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the 
distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage 
financing.31 
 
The resulting entity was Freddie Mac.32  Specifically, and as 
currently codified, Freddie Mac “is authorized to purchase, and make 
commitments to purchase, residential mortgages.  [Freddie Mac] may 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See supra Part I.A; see also infra note 31 and accompanying text.  As with 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac is also a privately controlled government-sponsored entity.  
See Forrester, supra note 8, at 1080–81. 
 30. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, Public Law No. 91-351, 84 
Stat. 450 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451–59) (2012)); see also 
Complaint ¶ 31, Wash. Fed. v. United States, No. 13-385C (Fed. Cl. June 10, 2013) 
[hereinafter Washington Federal Complaint]. 
 31. Public Law No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 1451–59) (2012)).  “Freddie Mac was created in 1970 to provide a secondary market 
for conventional mortgages originated by savings and loan associations.” Lore, supra 
note 9, at 3. 
 32. Cf. FREDDIE MAC, FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE ACT 1 (2010), available 
at http://www.freddiemac.com/governance/pdf/charter.pdf (showing Public Law No. 
91-351, 84 Stat. 450 as the charter document establishing Freddie Mac). 
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hold and deal with, and sell or otherwise dispose of, pursuant to 
commitments or otherwise, any such mortgage or interest therein.”33  
Also, according to Freddie Mac’s 10-K34 issued on December 31, 2012, 
its “public mission [is] to provide liquidity, stability, and affordability to 
the U.S. housing market.”35 
As with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac purchases loans with single-
family or multi-family residences put-up as collateral.36  Since January 
1, 2009, Freddie Mac has financed 1.8 million single-family purchases 
and 1.4 million units of multi-family rental housing.37 
II. THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF OBTAINING A LOAN THROUGH 
FANNIE MAE OR FREDDIE MAC 
In addition to providing the general history of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac (collectively, the “Companies”), it is beneficial, for 
background purposes, to briefly discuss some of the benefits and 
drawbacks that a mortgagor would encounter when originating a 
mortgage loan through the Companies.  This Part provides more insight 
into how the Companies operate and why a borrower might want to get 
involved with their somewhat burdensome loan process. 
A. STANDARDIZED FORMS 
When obtaining a loan through Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, the 
terms of the loan documents are fairly rigid and non-negotiable.38  This 
                                                                                                                 
 33. 12 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012). 
 34. A 10-K is an annual report, required by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, which provides “a comprehensive overview of the company’s business 
and financial condition.” Form 10-K, SEC, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
 35. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 30 (quoting the 
Freddie Mac December 31, 2012, 10-K). 
 36. See generally FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/ (last visited Aug. 
17, 2013). 
 37. See Corporate Facts, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/news/ 
corp_facts.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
 38. Cf., e.g., Forrester, supra note 8, at 1083–87; FREDDIE MAC, MULTIFAMILY 
LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT (CME) (2013), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/multifamily/docs/Loan_Agreement_CME.doc.  In 
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is, however, largely beneficial to most borrowers because the forms are 
the product of intense negotiations with consumer advocacy groups that 
sought the best possible terms for home buyers.39 
Although “[m]ost loans purchased and securitized by the 
[Companies] are fixed-rate loans,”40 borrowers of either program may 
obtain a loan with either a fixed41 or variable interest rate.42  The use of a 
fixed rate note allows the borrower to avoid fluctuations in the interest 
rate over the course of the loan and is generally a safer alternative for 
the cash-strapped borrower.43  Moreover, the attorney fees associated 
with a loan through the Companies should be lower because the 
documents have, in most respects, previously been negotiated and are 
now rather non-negotiable.  Therefore, fewer hours should be billed on a 
loan obtained through the Companies. 
                                                                                                                 
particular, Exhibit B of the Freddie Mac Loan Agreement requires that every change to 
the document be shown here and will only be permitted after Freddie Mac’s written 
consent. Cf. FREDDIE MAC, MULTIFAMILY LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT (CME) 
(2013), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/multifamily/docs/ 
Loan_Agreement_CME.doc.  Freddie Mac also utilizes a set of Uniform Covenants that 
are used in all multi-family mortgages, regardless of where the collateral is located. See 
FREDDIE MAC, UNIFORM COVENANTS (CME AND PORTFOLIO) (2013), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/multifamily/docs/Uniform_Covenants_CME_Portfolio 
.doc. 
 39. See Forrester, supra note 8, at 1083–87. 
 40. Id. at 1088. 
 41. See FANNIE MAE, SCHEDULE 2 TO MULTIFAMILY LOAN & SECURITY 
AGREEMENT, available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/legal_form/6102fr.doc; 
FREDDIE MAC, MULTIFAMILY NOTE (CME) MULTISTATE – FIXED RATE DEFEASANCE, 
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/multifamily/docs/ 
Note_Fixed_Rate_Defeasance_CME.doc. 
 42. See FANNIE MAE, SCHEDULE 2 TO MULTIFAMILY LOAN & SECURITY 
AGREEMENT, supra note 41; FREDDIE MAC, MULTIFAMILY NOTE (CME) MULTISTATE – 
FIXED RATE DEFEASANCE, supra note 41. 
 43. See Forrester, supra note 8, at 1088–89.  The interest rate on a fixed-rate loan 
will remain constant throughout the whole term of the loan whereas the interest rate on 
a variable-rate loan may fluctuate based on market conditions. See What is the 
Difference Between a Fixed-Rate and Adjustable-Rate Mortgage (ARM) Loan?, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
askcfpb/100/what-is-the-difference-between-a-fixed-rate-and-adjustable-rate-mortgage-
arm-loan.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
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The standardized forms also allow the Companies to pool loans 
together for securitization.44  This pooling is possible because the loans 
are fairly homogenous.45  For securitization to properly function, 
“[l]enders submit similar mortgaged loans” to the Companies.46  The 
reason for this characteristic is, in many ways, more out of convenience 
than necessity.  If the Companies were to securitize loans with varying 
loan terms, carve-outs, etc., the Companies would need to detail the 
terms of each individual loan to the investors.47  By only securitizing 
loans that are of the same type, in most substantive respects, the 
Companies can provide one description that is applicable to the entire 
pool of loans.  Obviously, this is easier for both the Companies and the 
secondary-market investors. 
Despite the advantages, standardized forms and take-it-or-leave-it 
terms can also be significant sticking points for many borrowers.  For 
example, the standard multi-family Fannie Mae Loan and Security 
Agreement lists sixteen numbered events of default that, generally, 
cannot be negotiated.48  Unless the borrower is a major investor with the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43. 
 45. See Forrester, supra note 8, at 1083; cf. FANNIE MAE, BASICS OF FANNIE MAE 
SINGLE-FAMILY MBS, supra note 24. 
 46. FANNIE MAE, BASICS OF FANNIE MAE SINGLE-FAMILY MBS, supra note 24 
(emphasis added). 
 47. Cf. FDIC, Securitizations, in MANAGING THE CRISIS:  THE FDIC AND RTC 
EXPERIENCE 1980-1994, at 405 (1998), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-16.pdf (stating that 
securitization is possible when using assets with “similar features”). 
 48. See FANNIE MAE, MULTIFAMILY LOAN & SECURITY AGREEMENT § 14.01 
(2013), available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/legal_form/6001nr.doc.  
Consider also the terms of the Fannie Mae Subordination, Assignment and Security 
Agreement that requires a senior-care facility operator, who may be completely 
unrelated to the borrower, to “pledge[] . . . [or] grant[] a security interest in and assign[] 
to Lender . . . all of [the operator’s] right, title and interest . . . in and to all Licenses and 
any other agreements or permits of any nature whatsoever.” FANNIE MAE, 
SUBORDINATION, ASSIGNMENT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT § 5 (2013), available at 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/legal_form/6446srs.doc.  An entity that is only 
responsible for operating a facility, rather than owning it, has very little incentive to 
make such a pledge.  Because this is a required form in this type of loan, an operator’s 
refusal to execute the form may be sufficient to completely derail the borrower’s loan. 
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clout to convince the Companies to make special exceptions, borrowers 
are largely stuck with the pre-negotiated terms in the loan documents.49 
B. BURDENSOME LOAN PROCESS 
Likely, the largest drawback to obtaining a loan through the 
Companies is the somewhat overly burdensome loan process.  While 
arguments can be made as to why borrowers might actually prefer the 
non-negotiable, standardized loan forms, similar arguments are difficult 
to find with this aspect of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans. 
First, borrowers and lenders must complete a myriad of forms 
before the Companies will purchase the loan.50  Some of these forms 
require a great deal of information of loan-specific details to be 
completed prior to delivering the loan to the Companies.51  Moreover, 
the Companies are very particular about how the forms are to be 
completed, executed, and delivered.  For example, a multi-family loan 
package to Freddie Mac must be delivered within a five-day window 
before the delivery deadline;52 otherwise, the lender will need Freddie 
Mac’s permission to make a delivery at any time outside of this five-day 
period, even if the loan is being delivered earlier than this delivery 
window.53  This seems counterintuitive, as most lending houses would 
presumably prefer to get the loan documents as soon as they are 
completed and available. 
                                                                                                                 
 49. This should not be misunderstood to mean that the loan documents cannot be 
amended to take into account deal-specific circumstances that do not affect the 
substance of the loan terms.  For a more thorough discussion on the Companies’ forms, 
see Forrester, supra note 8. 
 50. See generally Loan Documents, FANNIE MAE, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/multifamily/loan-documents (last visited Aug. 18, 2013); 
Multifamily Loan Documents FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
multifamily/guide/documents.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).  The forms listed on 
these pages are just the loan forms themselves.  They do not include the forms that must 
be completed by a lender’s underwriting department. 
 51. See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, SCHEDULE 2 TO MULTIFAMILY LOAN & SECURITY 
AGREEMENT, supra note 41. 
 52. See § 32.1(c):  Delivery and Review Period, ALLREGS ONLINE (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://www.allregs.com (on file with author). 
 53. Presumably, however, this is due to the large number of loans that the 
Companies are processing at any given time. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 28, 37. 
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C. INTEREST RATES 
Even those borrowers who would prefer to negotiate the details of 
their loan and avoid cumbersome loan procedures will still sometimes 
obtain their loan through one of the Companies because the interest rates 
are generally more favorable.54  “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac [are] 
privately owned (for profit) businesses but, because their bonds [are] 
backed by the federal government, they [are] able to borrow funds at 50 
to 75 points cheaper than private lenders.”55  For example, the average 
loan commitment rate on thirty-year fixed rate loans obtained through 
Freddie Mac in July 2013 was 4.37%.56  On the other hand, the national 
average for this type of loan during the same timeframe was 4.56%.57  
Although this might seem like a somewhat small difference, the 
Companies purchase loans obtained on large, multimillion dollar 
apartment complexes in addition to single-family residences.58  Because 
of these savings over the life of the loan, some borrowers are willing to 
give up the negotiability that is traditionally found in the loan process.59 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Compare 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages Since 1971, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2013) (showing 
the monthly average loan commitment rate on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages since 
1971), with Mortgage Interest Rates, BARCHART.COM, http://www.barchart.com/ 
economy/mortgageallrates.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2013) (showing the average 
mortgage rate for the last four years). 
 55. JAMES GWARTNEY, ET AL., SPECIAL TOPIC:  CRASH OF 2008, at 6 (2009), 
available at http://commonsenseeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
CSE_CrashOf2008.pdf. 
 56. See 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages Since 1971, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
 57. See Mortgage Interest Rates, BARCHART.COM, http://www.barchart.com/ 
economy/mortgageallrates.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
 58. See generally Fannie Mae Multifamily Business Homepage, FANNIE MAE, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/multifamily/index (last visited Aug. 18, 2013); Overview, 
FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/multifamily/overview.html (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2013). 
 59. Cf. How Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Save You Money, HOUSELOGIC (Jan. 11, 
2010), http://www.houselogic.com/home-advice/fannie-mae-freddie-mac/how-fannie-
mae-and-freddie-mac-save-you-money/# (stating that “[h]ome owners who use Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages save thousands of dollars in interest payments each 
year”). 
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III. THE PRECURSOR: THE HOUSING CRISIS OF 2007-2008 
A. THE BUBBLE TAKES SHAPE 
Throughout the 1990s, the housing market was relatively stable, but 
by 2002, home prices rose drastically.60  In 2006, however, the market 
began to turn around and was in a free-fall throughout 2007 and 2008.61  
Much scholarly research was conducted to determine the cause of the 
“housing bubble,” but four leading researchers narrowed it down to four 
simple factors: “(1) relaxed mortgage lending standards, (2) low short-
term interest rate policy of the Fed, (3) increased leveraging by 
investment banks, and (4) increased debt-to-income ratio for 
households.”62 
1. The Relaxation of Lending Standards 
The first factor, a relaxation of lending standards, paved the way 
for the housing crisis as early as 1995.63  Although much of the criticism 
that surrounded the relaxation of the lending standards is placed on the 
banking industry, this policy change was “the result of federal policy 
                                                                                                                 
 60. GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 4.  “Between January 2002 and mid-year 
2006, housing prices increased by a whopping 87 percent.” Id.  In the second quarter of 
2006, home prices has risen 132 percent over what they were in 1997.   See Holt, supra 
note 25, at 121.  To be sure, empirical data shows that “real house prices had been 
essentially unchanged for 100 years prior to 1995.” Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble 
and the Financial Crisis, 46 REAL-WORD ECONOMIC REV., 73, 73 (2008).  Trending 
similarly as home prices were mortgage defaults. See GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 
55, at 4 (stating that the mortgage default rate only fluctuated about 2 percent from 
1979 through 2008). 
 61. See GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 4. 
 62. Holt, supra note 25, at 121. 
 63. See GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 7.  According to former Texas 
Senator Phil Gramm, “[t]he origin of the subprime mortgage blowout that sparked the 
financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 goes back to the Clinton administration.  Dan Weil, 
Phil Gramm:  Roots of Subprime Mortgage Crisis Extend to Clinton Administration, 
MONEYNEWS (Aug. 15, 2013, 8:05 AM), http://www.moneynews.com/ 
PrintTemplate?modeid=520531.  More specifically, the Clinton administration issued 
new regulations to the Community Reinvestment Act that established a quota system 
whereby lenders were required to “meet numeric goals based on the minority 
population in” the lender’s service area.  GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 9. 
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designed to promote more home ownership among households with 
incomes below the median.”64  Despite this laudable goal, “the federal 
government imposed a complex set of regulations and mandates that 
forced various lending institutions to extend more loans to low- and 
moderate-income households.”65  Put simply, “Congress . . . forced 
everybody to go and give mortgages to people who were on the cusp [of 
being able to afford such a mortgage].”66 
Starting in 1996, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) established a new requirement whereby below-
median borrowers had to make up at least of 40% of the loans purchased 
by the Companies.67  This percentage grew to 56% by 2008.68  This 
requirement “caused Fannie and Freddie to relax the standards that 
mortgages had to meet to be classified as ‘conforming’ and thus eligible 
for purchase by Fannie and Freddie.”69  These loans became known as 
“subprime mortgages.”70  Essentially, “[Congress] . . . pushed Fannie 
and Freddie to make a bunch of loans that were imprudent.”71 
The Companies were not the only ones pressured to make risky 
loans.  Congress applied this pressure, at least in part, in a passive 
manner by making it widely known that the Companies were mandated 
to purchase these uncertain loans from the lenders.  Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                 
 64. GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 6. 
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. Steve Denning, Lest We Forget:  Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES 
(Nov. 22, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/ 
5086/print/ (quoting then-current New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg). 
 67. See GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 8. 
 68. See id.  In a moment of hindsight, the former director of the FHFA has since 
stated, “The affordable-housing goals set by HUD were, in retrospect, too high and 
caused both of [the Companies] to do things they shouldn’t have done, such as Fannie’s 
getting involved in the subprime market . . . .” Alan J. Heavens, Stable Market for 
Housing Still Elusive Despite Programs, Officials Say, Lack of Readiness, Joblessness 
Are Hurting Efforts, PHILLY.COM (June 21, 2009), http://articles.philly.com/2009-06-
21/business/25286384_1_mortgage-servicers-mortgage-broker-hud-approved-
counseling-agencies. 
 69. Holt, supra note 25, at 124.  Beginning in 1999, the Companies were also 
required to accept “smaller down payments and extend larger loans relative to income.  
Denning, supra note 66. 
 70. See Baker, supra note 60, at 76.  “Subprime mortgages [a]re loans issued to 
people with poor credit histories.” Id. 
 71. Denning, supra note 66. 
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originators of the subprime mortgages had little incentive to probe the 
borrowers’ credit history or ability to repay the loans.72  In other words, 
the lenders were assured that most of the risk would be borne by the 
Companies, not the originators.73 
Additionally, because the subprime mortgages were mixed together 
with the prime mortgages when the loans were pooled and securitized, 
“‘[n]o one had enough financial skin in the performance of any single 
loan to care whether it was good or not.’”74  If one of the mortgages in 
the pool went into default, it would not be significant enough to affect 
the overall quality of the pool as a whole.75  This rationale, however, did 
not stop with a single subprime mortgage pooled with a bevy of prime 
ones.  Rather, by 2005, the subprime mortgage market accounted for 
twenty-five percent of the loans made.76 
2. The Federal Reserve’s Uncommonly Low Interest Rate 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) 
primarily focused on “price stability.”77  As a result, the inflation rate 
was relatively low and “monetary policy-makers avoided abrupt year-to-
year changes in the general level of prices.”78  The policy-makers’ focus 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 8. 
 73. See id.  Interestingly, on October 25, 2013, JPMorgan Chase & Co. announced 
a $5.1 billion settlement for claims that it misled the Companies “about the quality of 
mortgage securities and home loans it sold to them during the housing boom.” Aruna 
Viswanatha & David Henry, JPMorgan in $5.1 Billion Deal with Housing Agency, 
REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/10/26/us-jpmorgan-
settlement-idUSBRE99O12820131026. 
 74. Holt, supra note 25, at 124 (quoting MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK:  A 360° 
LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009)). 
 75. See id. at 125. 
 76. See Baker, supra note 60, at 76.  To fully understand why this was a problem, it 
is necessary to consider the depths of the subprime-mortgage market and what these 
mortgages entailed.  Of the loans purchased by Fannie Mae from 2005 to 2007, “97 
percent were interest-only mortgages, 68 percent had original loan-to-value ratios 
greater than 90 percent, and 67 percent were extended to borrowers with FICO scores 
lower than 620.”  GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 9. 
 77. See GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 10. 
 78. Id. (stating that in the “mid-1980s, the inflation rate had been reduced to 3 
percent”). 
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began to shift to market manipulation in the early- to mid-2000s when 
the Fed began to “control . . .  real variables such as employment and 
real GDP.”79 
As a result of this new focus, the Fed lowered the short-term 
interest rates and began pumping cash into the economy, particularly 
into the banking system, thereby allowing lenders to offer 
unprecedentedly low interest rates.80  During 2001, the interest rate was 
reduced eleven times, dropping to a low of 1.75%.81  Unfortunately, 
borrowers became extremely shortsighted and never contemplated the 
notion that the borrower-friendly market may turn around, so they took 
advantage of the extremely low interest rates by entering into adjustable 
rate mortgages (“ARMs”).82  Once the interest rates started ticking back 
up, many of these borrowers were unable to afford their monthly 
mortgage payments.83 
3. Investment Banks Began to Heavily Leverage Their Portfolios 
In 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) 
“made it possible for investment banks to increase the leverage of their 
investment capital”84 by passing the International Convergence of 
Capital Measurements and Capital Standards, which became known as 
Basel I.85  The tenets of Basel I are divided into four “pillars.”86  For 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 10–11. 
 81. See Holt, supra note 25, at 123.  These historically low interest rates allowed 
investors to start leveraging their investments.  See id.  For example, “investors could 
increase their returns by borrowing at low short-term interest rates and investing in 
higher yielding long-term investments, such as mortgaged-backed securities.”  Id. 
 82. See GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 11.  “Adjustable rate mortgages 
jumped from 17 percent of the total [number of mortgages being made] during 1998-
2001 to 33 percent during 2004-2005.”  Id. 
 83. See Holt, supra note 25, at 123. 
 84. GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 12.  “A leverage ratio is simply the ratio 
of a firm’s debt to its assets.” Id. 
 85. See id.  Basel I was established by the Basel Committee, which is “a group of 
eleven nations, that, after the messy 1974 liquidation of the Cologne-based Bank 
Herstatt, decided to form a cooperative council to harmonize banking standards and 
regulations within and between all member states.”  Bryan J. Balin, Basel I, Basel II, 
and Emerging Markets:  A Nontechnical Analysis 1 (May 10, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1477712. 
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purposes of the housing bubble analysis, however, it is only necessary to 
consider three of the four pillars. 
The third pillar of the Basel I regulations “sets a universal standard 
whereby 8% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets must be covered by Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital reserves.”87  The first pillar defines Tier 1 and Tier 2 
Capital.88  Tier 1 Capital “consists of only two types of funds—disclosed 
cash reserves and other capital paid for by the sale of bank equity.”89  
Tier 2 Capital includes various types of reserves, holdings, and potential 
gains.90 
The rub, however, is that Basel I’s second pillar “provide[d] more 
favorable treatment of residential loans.”91  Banks began pooling 
mortgages together and financing them with securities, and due to the 
low default rate leading up to the housing crash, these securities were 
considered relatively safe investments.92  But because many of these 
home loans were taken out by borrowers who would be unable to make 
monthly payments once the ARM interest rates started creeping up, 
these pools were anything but safe.93  “The money borrowed to purchase 
these securities was short-term debt, which meant that it had to be paid 
back very quickly.  When the value of the mortgage-backed securities 
collapsed, the highly levered investment banks faced massive short-term 
debt obligations with few reserves on which to draw.”94 
4. Homeowners Bit Off More than They Could Chew 
Starting in 1950, and for the next thirty years, “household debt as a 
share of disposable (after-tax) income ranged from 40 percent to 60 
percent.”95  In 2007, however, household debt peaked at 135%.96  
Because mortgage interest payments are tax deductible and many 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See Balin, supra note 85, at 3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. GWARTNEY, ET AL., supra note 55, at 12. 
 92. See id. at 12–13. 
 93. See id. at 13. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 14. 
 96. See id. 
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outstanding loans at the time were structured as ARMs, many 
homeowners held much of their debt in their homes and did not increase 
the homes’ equity.97  Therefore, when the interest rates started going up, 
these homeowners simply walked away from their would-be 
investments.98  Because most lenders do not want to keep foreclosed 
residences on their books, they began selling those residences at 
discounted rates, thereby depressing the housing market as a whole.99 
B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REACTS TO THE BUBBLE’S POP BY 
PASSING HERA 
The above factors eventually caused the housing bubble to pop, and 
the Companies “suffered significant book losses and a substantial 
decline in value.”100  Because the Companies were unsure as to the 
extent of the losses, they began recording losses on their balance sheets 
before the losses were actually incurred.101  Naturally, Congress grew 
concerned over the extensive losses and decided to take action.102 
Congress responded by enacting the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”),103 which established the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (the “FHFA”) to oversee the Companies.104  
HERA also empowered the FHFA to place the Companies into 
conservatorship and to “take such action as may be—(i) necessary to put 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id.  “[T]he foreclosure rate for subprime borrowers [was] approximately 10 
times higher for fixed rate mortgages and 7 times higher for adjustable rate mortgages.” 
Id. at 15. 
 99. See The Impact of Foreclosures on the Housing Market, FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF CLEVELAND, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/ 
2010/2010-15.cfm (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
 100. Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 38. 
 101. See id.  This method of adjusting one’s balance sheets is acceptable under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. See id.  Pursuant to this method of 
accounting, Fannie Mae showed losses of $72 billion in 2009 and Freddie Mac booked 
losses of $50 billion in 2008.  Id. 
 102. See infra notes 103-109 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Complaint ¶ 42, Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-
00465-MMS (Fed. Cl. July 9, 2013) [hereinafter Fairholme Funds Fed. Cl. Complaint]; 
Housing & Econ. Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654; see also 
12 U.S.C. §§ 1455, 1719, 4617 (2012). 
 104. See Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 38. 
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the regulated entity in a sound and solvent condition, and (ii) appropriate 
to carry on the business of the regulated entity and preserve and 
conserve the assets and property of the regulated entity.”105  On 
September 6, 2008, the FHFA did just that: it placed the Companies into 
conservatorship.106  In doing so, the FHFA had “to continue the 
operations of [the] regulated entit[ies], rehabilitate [them] and return 
[them] to a safe, sound and solvent condition.”107 
In addition to conservatorship, HERA permits the United States 
Treasury (the “Treasury”) to purchase specially issued government stock 
                                                                                                                 
 105. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D).  HERA set forth several acceptable grounds under 
which the Companies may be placed into conservatorship or receivership. 12 U.S.C.  
§ 4617(a)(3)(A)-(L).  Some of the plaintiffs are claiming that merely placing the 
Companies into conservatorship was inappropriate because none of the statute’s 
grounds were satisfied.  See Washington Federal Complaint, supra note 30, ¶¶ 91–152 
(providing an in-depth analysis of how the Companies failed to meet any of HERA’s 
threshold requirements before they could be placed into conservatorship or 
receivership). 
 106. See Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 40.  James B. 
Lockhart, the FHFA Director at the time of placing the Companies into 
conservatorship, described conservatorship as “a statutory process designed to stabilize 
a troubled institution with the objective of returning the entities to normal business 
operations.” Press Release, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Statement of FHFA 
Director James B. Lockhart (Sept. 7, 2008), available at  
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/ 
fhfa_statement_090708hp1128.pdf (emphasis added).  Conservatorship should be 
contrasted with the act of placing the Companies into receivership under the statute 
because this requires that the FHFA liquidate the Companies. Compare 5 U.S.C.  
§ 4617(b)(2)(B), (D) with 5 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(E). 
Some of the plaintiffs contend that the government’s motives for placing the 
Companies into conservatorship were not entirely pure, arguing that the federal 
government used the Companies to unload the “toxic debt” plaguing other financial 
institutions.  See Washington Federal Complaint, supra note 30, ¶¶ 74–78.  The 
Companies “were forced to assume more risky assets and increase their overall 
exposure to additional, future losses by guaranteeing even more MBS, all in order to 
support other financial institutions and facilitate the Government’s public policy 
objectives.”  Id. ¶ 14.  Bolstering this argument, Henry Paulson, Secretary of the 
Treasury, explained in 2011, “[W]e really need to use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
do anything that’s reasonable to provide financial support to the mortgage market.” 
Brian Bolduc, Paulson’s Down Payment, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://nationalreview.com/articles/283465/paulson-s-down-payment-brian-bolduc. 
 107. Conservatorship & Receivership, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,724, 35,730 (June 20, 2011) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1237 (2013)). 
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in the Companies.108  Under this authority, the Treasury entered into 
preferred stock purchase agreements (“PSPA”) with the Companies 
whereby the “Treasury purchased 1 million shares of Government 
Preferred Stock from each of the Companies in exchange for allowing 
them to draw up to $100 billion each from [the] Treasury.”109  
Importantly, this Government Preferred Stock (“GPS”) is senior to all 
other outstanding stock in the Companies.110 
As consideration for purchasing the GPS, the Treasury was to 
receive “$1 billion of senior preferred stock in each” of the Companies 
as well as warrants that would permit the Treasury to purchase up to 
79.9% of the common stock of each of the Companies.111  Moreover, the 
GPS accumulated a 10% dividend annually.112 
Soon after the PSPA was executed, the Companies began drawing 
on their lines of credit with the Treasury,113 and over the next three 
years, the Companies borrowed a combined total of approximately 
$189.4 billion from the Treasury.114  Some contend, however, that a 
large portion of this borrowed money was unnecessarily loaned because 
large amounts of the Treasury’s funds were used to cover the book 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(1)(A), 1719(g)(1)(A) (2012). 
 109. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶ 36, Perry Capital 
LLC v. Lew, No. 1:13-cv-01025 (D.D.C. July 7, 2013) [hereinafter Perry Capital 
Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief]; see also AMENDED & 
RESTATED SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY & FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, ¶ 6 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23898/seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagreementfnm1.pdf; 
AMENDED & RESTATED SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY & FED. HOME LOAN MORTG. CORP., ¶ 3 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23900/seniorpreferredstockpurchaseagree mentfrea.pdf. 
 110. See Henry Paulson, Secretary, Dep’t of Treasury, Announcement Regarding 
Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac (Sept. 7, 2008), available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/economy/paulsonstatement/; see also 
Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 43. 
 111. Fact Sheet:  Treasury Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, U.S. 
TREASURY OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, 30 (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.fhfa.gov/ 
webfiles/23896/pspa_factsheet_090708%20.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Fact Sheet]. 
 112. See id.  While the GPS was outstanding, the Companies were not permitted to 
issue any dividends except to the Treasury.  Id. 
 113. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 52. 
 114. See id. ¶ 60. 
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losses,115 which proved to be excessive,116 and to pay the Treasury its 
10% dividend.117 
In any event, the Treasury funding, combined with a rebounding 
housing market,118 allowed the Companies to stay afloat, and after three 
years of conservatorship, the Companies began to generate profits.119  
Fannie Mae, in the second quarter of 2012, reported a $2.8 billion profit, 
which accounted for its dividend obligations to the Treasury.120  
Similarly, Freddie Mac reported a $2.9 billion profit during the same 
timeframe.121 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
 116. See, e.g., Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 51. 
[B]etween the beginning of 2007 and the second quarter of 2012, the 
Companies had placed more than $234 billion in reserve to absorb 
anticipated loan losses.  But over the same time period, the 
Companies had realized loan losses of just over $125 billion.  In 
other words, the Companies had overstated their projected loan 
losses by $109 billion which was artificially weighing down their net 
worth. 
Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 
109, ¶ 44. 
 117. Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 51.  According to one of 
the complaints filed against the federal government, “since 2010, but for the dividends 
the Companies were required to pay the Treasury under the Stock Agreements, the 
Companies would not have needed the Treasury to provide additional capital by 
purchasing additional stock at all.” Washington Federal Complaint, supra note 30, ¶ 
157. 
 118. See Jarkko Turunen, The U.S. Housing Market’s Road to Recovery, 
ECONOMONITOR (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/08/the-u-s-
housing-markets-road-to-recovery/. 
 119. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 62, 66. 
 120. See FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, FORM 10-Q, at 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/2012/ 
q22012.pdf; see also Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 64. 
 121. See FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, FORM 10-Q, supra note 120; see also 
Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 66. 
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C. THE FHFA AND TREASURY IMPLEMENT THE “NET WORTH SWEEP” 
AND ATTEMPT TO SHUTTER THE COMPANIES 
Even though the Companies appeared to be returning to 
profitability, which led private investors to believe that they would soon 
begin to receive dividends on their stock in the Companies again, the 
FHFA and Treasury plotted a different course for the Companies.  On 
August 17, 2012, the Treasury announced an amendment to the PSPA 
whereby the 10% dividend that the Treasury had been receiving on its 
GPS122 would be replaced with all of the Companies’ profits.123  This 
amendment has been termed the “Net Worth Sweep.”124  Pursuant to the 
Net Worth Sweep, the Companies, starting on January 1, 2013, have 
been making quarterly dividend payments to the Treasury in the amount 
of their profits, “minus a capital reserve that starts at $3 billion and 
decreases to $0 by January 1, 2018.”125  To be sure, in a press release 
that coincided with the Net Worth Sweep, the Treasury flatly stated that 
the Net Worth Sweep “will replace the 10 percent dividend payments 
made to Treasury on its preferred stock investments in Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac with a quarterly sweep of every dollar of profit that each 
firm earns going forward.”126 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 123. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, THIRD 
AMENDMENT TO AMENDED & RESTATED SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT ¶ 3 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/Fannie.Mae.Amendement.pdf [hereinafter Fannie Mae Net Worth 
Sweep]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & FED. HOME LOAN MORTG. CORP., THIRD 
AMENDMENT TO AMENDED & RESTATED SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT ¶ 3 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/Freddie.Mac.Amendment.pdf [hereinafter Freddie Mac Net Worth 
Sweep]. 
 124. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 71. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Dep’t Announces Further 
Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Aug. 17, 2012), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1684.aspx 
[hereinafter Treasury 2012 Press Release].  According to the Treasury, the Companies 
profits will be seized and used to benefit taxpayers for their investment in the 
Companies.  See id. 
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Moreover, increased profit for the Treasury was not the singular 
aim of the Net Worth Sweep.127  The Net Worth Sweep was also 
designed to force the Companies out of the housing market because, 
according to the press release,128 another objective of the Net Worth 
Sweep is that the Companies “will be wound down and will not be 
allowed to retain profits, rebuild capital, and return to the market in their 
prior form.”129  In addition to seizing the Companies’ profits and to 
further facilitate this winding down process, the Companies are also 
required to “accelerate [the] reduction of [their] investment 
portfolios.”130  This announcement understandably caused the stock 
prices of the Companies to plummet over 50% the day following this 
announcement.131 
IV. THE PRIVATE INVESTORS REACT TO THE NET WORTH SWEEP: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Approximately one year following the Treasury’s announcement of 
the Net Worth Sweep, the private investors filed suits against the FHFA, 
the Treasury, the United States, and various individuals in the federal 
government.132  Each filed complaint alleges one or more similar claims 
against the federal government, including: unconstitutional taking under 
the Fifth Amendment;133 FHFA action without proper authority;134 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  “Those portfolios will now be wound down at an annual rate of 15 percent 
– an increase from the 10 percent annual reduction required in the previous 
agreements.”  Id. 
 131. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 77. 
 132. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15; Fairholme Funds Fed. 
Cl. Complaint, supra note 103; Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 109; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12.  
The plaintiffs in these lawsuits are those that purchased one of several classes of junior 
preferred stock in the Companies.  See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 
15, ¶ 19; Fairholme Funds Fed. Cl. Complaint, supra note 103, ¶ 17; Washington 
Federal Complaint, supra note 30; Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory 
& Injunctive Relief, supra note 109, ¶ 25; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra 
note 12, ¶ 18. 
 133. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 78–94; Fairholme 
Funds Fed. Cl. Complaint, supra note 103, ¶¶ 76-88. 
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improper FHFA conduct under the Administrative Procedure Act;135 
action by the Treasury without proper authority;136 improper conduct by 
the Treasury under the Administrative Procedure Act;137 breach of 
contract against the FHFA;138 breach of implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing against FHFA;139 and breach of fiduciary duty against 
FHFA in its role as conservator of the Companies.140  This Part explains 
each of these claims and their likelihood of success. 
A. UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Three of the lawsuits filed in 2013 contend that the federal 
government unconstitutionally appropriated the investors’ property by 
enacting the Net Worth Sweep.141  The Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”142  
Accordingly, the plaintiffs in these three suits argue that, because the 
federal government amended the PSPA in a way that would prevent the 
private stockholders from receiving a dividend on the privately owned 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 79–87; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 84–93. 
 135. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 88–94; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 94–99. 
 136. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 58–68; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 100–
10. 
 137. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 69–78; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 111–
20. 
 138. See Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 121–28. 
 139. See id. ¶¶ 129–35. 
 140. See id. ¶¶ 136–145. 
 141. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 78–94; Fairholme 
Funds Fed. Cl. Complaint, supra note 103, ¶¶ 76–88; Washington Federal Complaint, 
supra note 30, ¶¶ 187–88. 
 142. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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stock, the stockholders were unconstitutionally deprived of their 
property.143 
The largest potential hurdle with this count that these plaintiffs will 
need to clear is whether the federal government took property.  Unlike 
in straightforward eminent domain actions, the federal government did 
not seize a tangible piece of property in these cases.  Rather, the Net 
Worth Sweep interrupted the right to receive future payments.  
Therefore, these plaintiffs must establish that this right constitutes 
“property” under the Fifth Amendment. 
“The Constitution neither creates nor defines the scope of property 
interest compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”144  Therefore, it is 
necessary to look to the laws that purportedly establish the property 
rights of the thing being seized by the government145 as well as the 
“‘existing rules and understandings’ and ‘background principles’ 
derived from independent sources, such as state, federal, or common 
law.”146  Because the federal courts should look to state law to determine 
whether property rights were created, one must examine the claims over 
Freddie Mac stock separate from those involving Fannie Mae stock.147 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 78–94; Fairholme 
Funds Fed. Cl. Complaint, supra note 103, ¶¶ 76–88; Washington Federal Complaint, 
supra note 30, ¶¶ 187–88. 
 144. Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Conti v. United States, 291, F.3d 1090, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (citing Bd. of Regents of Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))). 
 145. See id. (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577–78). 
 146. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)) 
(emphasis added).  “The Court . . . frequently has taken a very positivist approach [to 
defining property], looking to the state law defining the property interest, in deciding 
whether there is property under the Constitution.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 658 (3d ed. 2006). 
  There is a possibility that the reviewing court would eschew the application of 
state law by holding that, because the Companies are government-sponsored entities, 
federal law should apply.  The problem with this line of thought is that the quasi-public 
natures of the Companies are rare, and there does not appear to be much federal case 
law or statutes that will shine light on the issue of whether stock rights are considered 
“property” under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.  Therefore, unless the court is 
willing to unnecessarily create new case law, it will most likely look to the states that 
govern the relationship between the Companies and their respective shareholders. 
 147. An examining court should consider “whether the citizen had the rights to 
exclude, use, transfer, or dispose of the property.”  Members of Peanut Quota Holders 
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1. Stock Dividends Pursuant to Fannie Mae Preferred Stock 
Before Fannie Mae was placed into conservatorship, several 
different series of preferred stock were issued for purchase by private 
investors.148  Each series, however, contained a similar Certificate of 
Designation that created the stockholders’ dividend rights under the 
preferred stock.149  These certificates held: 
Holders of record of [the particular series of] Preferred Stock (each 
individually a “Holder,” or collectively the “Holders”) will be 
entitled to receive, ratably, when, as and if declared by the Board of 
Directors, in its sole discretion out of funds legally available 
therefore, non-cumulative cash dividends at [the specified percentage 
rate] per annum of the [specified] stated value . . . per share of [the 
particular series of] Preferred Stock.150 
Delaware law, which should govern in the transactions between 
Fannie Mae and its stockholders,151 is renowned for providing much 
flexibility to those businesses operating under Delaware law.152  The 
Delaware General Corporation Law allows businesses and their 
shareholders to regulate their own affairs and allocate risks as they see 
fit.153  Delaware law, however, has long provided that under certain 
circumstances, the right to receive dividends is considered “property” 
that is, therefore, protected under the Fifth Amendment.154 
                                                                                                                 
Ass’n, Inc., 421 F.3d at 1330 (citing United States v. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378 
(1945)). 
 148. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 34. 
 149. See id. ¶ 36. 
 150. Id. (omissions in original) (emphasis added). 
 151. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶ 75. 
 152. See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1–2 (2007), 
available at http://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/whycorporations_english.pdf. 
 153. See id. at 2. 
 154. See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115, 125 (Del. 1936) (holding that “a just 
public policy, which seeks the equal and impartial protection of the interests of all, 
demands that the right [of a holder of cumulative preferred stock to unpaid dividends] 
be regarded as a vested right of property secured against destruction by the Federal and 
State Constitutions”) (emphasis added). 
2014] ARE THE FEDS FORCING FANNIE AND FREDDIE  515 
INTO RETIREMENT? 
  
The Delaware cases that deem cash dividends as “property” have a 
similar element that appears to be missing from the cases at hand.  In the 
previous cases, the stocks in question were deemed cumulative.155  
When stock is “cumulative” in nature, it “means that if dividends are not 
paid in any year, the obligation accumulates.”156  Therefore, the holder 
of cumulative stock has a vested and established right to receive a 
dividend, even if a dividend was not declared157 to occur at a particular 
time.  If no dividend is declared, the corporation’s obligation to pay that 
dividend continues until the dividend is, in fact, declared and paid.158 
Unfortunately for the Fannie Mae preferred stockholders, their 
stock is explicitly noncumulative and declared only in the Board of 
Director’s “sole discretion.”159  Therefore, these stockholders’ right to 
receive dividend payments has not vested.  Their right to receive 
payment is merely speculative until declared, and this right to payment 
does not compound if Fannie Mae chooses to not declare a dividend.  It 
appears that no Delaware court has ruled on whether noncumulative, 
undeclared dividends constitute property.160 
Accordingly, there appears to be a strong indication that a 
Delaware court would most likely find that the right of the Fannie Mae 
preferred stockholders to noncumulative, undeclared dividends does not 
constitute “property” under the Fifth Amendment that would entitle 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See, e.g., Shanik v. White Sewing Mach. Corp., 19 A.2d 831, 834–35 (Del. 
1941) (citing and analyzing several Delaware cases wherein the courts found 
accumulated dividends to be property). 
 156. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND 
FINANCE 306 (10th ed. 2007). 
 157. A “declared dividend” is a dividend that has been approved by a corporation’s 
board of directors but has yet to be paid to the stockholders.  See 18 C.J.S. 
Corporations § 366.  Once declared, the dividend becomes a debt payable to the 
shareholders.  See id. 
 158. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 156, at 306.  For example, XYZ Corp. pays a 
cumulative dividend of $500 to each of its preferred stockholders at the end of each 
year.  If this dividend is not paid one year, the obligation rolls into the following year.  
Now, at the end of the next year, the obligation to each of the preferred shareholders 
stands at $1,000. 
 159. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 36. 
 160. Cf. Garrett v. Edge Moor Iron Co., 194 A. 15, 17 (Del. Ch. 1937) (explicitly 
avoiding an analysis of whether noncumulative dividends are considered property). 
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those stockholders to compensation due to the federal government’s 
interference with that right.161 
2. Stock Dividends Pursuant to Freddie Mac Preferred Stock 
As with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac issued several series of preferred 
stock with similar Certificates of Designation before being placed into 
conservatorship.162  These certificates, which are, in pertinent part, 
substantively similar to Fannie Mae’s, state: “[h]olders of outstanding 
shares of Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive, 
ratably, when, as and if declared by the Board of Directors, in its sole 
discretion, out of funds legally available therefore, noncumulative cash 
dividends at the [specified] annual rate per share of Non-Cumulative 
Preferred Stock.”163  Unlike with Fannie Mae, however, the analysis of 
whether the Freddie Mac preferred stockholders have a viable claim 
under the Fifth Amendment focuses on Virginia law.164 
Virginia, unlike Delaware, appears to consider dividends, which are 
payable even on cumulative stock, to not be a vested property right.165  
Rather than focusing on the cumulative or noncumulative nature of 
dividends, Virginia law looks at the “right to demand payment of 
cumulated undeclared dividends.”166  Therefore, a plaintiff making a 
property-based claim in Virginia would most likely need to show that he 
or she had the right to demand a dividend or to the funds out of which 
the dividends would be paid.167  A Virginia court would consider the 
property right to be vested only if such a claim could be made.168 
Because Delaware is home to many corporations,169 it has had more 
opportunities than most other states, including Virginia, to weigh in on 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See supra notes 148–160 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 35. 
 163. Id. ¶ 37 (emphasis added). 
 164. Cf. Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶ 75. 
 165. See O’Brien v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 152 S.E. 2d 278, 286–87 (Va. 1967). 
 166. Id. at 286. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. at 287. 
 169. See Jan Ting, Why Do So Many Corporations Choose to Incorporate in 
Delaware?, NEWSWORKS (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/ 
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the complexities of the modern business and securities landscape.  
Accordingly, should the Virginia courts wish to change their stance on 
the issue of whether certain dividends may qualify as property, it would 
not be surprising if they were to take a similar position to Delaware’s.170  
In any event, however, it is unlikely that the holders of Freddie Mac 
stock would be able to successfully make a Fifth Amendment taking 
claim using Virginia law’s definition of property because they are 
unable to prove that they had a right to demand a dividend or to the 
funds out of which a dividend might have been paid.171 
3. Liquidation Rights Pursuant to the Companies’ Preferred Stock 
In addition to claiming that the federal government took their right 
to receive stock dividends, the plaintiffs also assert a claim that their 
liquidation rights were impermissibly taken under the Fifth 
Amendment.172  Unlike the above claim, which turns on whether 
property was taken, the sticking point regarding the liquidation rights is 
whether any property was actually “taken” by the federal government. 
Again, an actionable claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Taking 
Clause173 requires a physical or regulatory taking.174  Obviously, there 
cannot be a physical taking of an economic right.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to determine whether the federal government issued a 
regulation that caused there to be “no reasonable economically viable 
use of [the] property.”175  The rub, however, is determining when a 
regulation is burdensome enough to constitute a taking and when it 
merely results in property devaluation.176  The Supreme Court admitted 
the difficulty in drawing this line: 
                                                                                                                 
local//brandywine-to-broad/18206-why-do-so-many-corporations-choose-to-
incorporate-in-delaware. 
 170. See generally id. 
 171. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 35. 
 172. See id. ¶¶ 78-94; Fairholme Funds Fed. Cl. Complaint, supra note 103, ¶¶ 76–
88. 
 173. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 174. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 146, at 640. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. at 646. 
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[W]e have eschewed the development of any set formula for 
identifying a “taking” forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, and have 
relied instead on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of 
each particular case.  To aid in this determination, however, we have 
identified three factors which have “particular significance”: (1) “the 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the extent 
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental 
action.”177 
This discretionary standard makes it rather difficult to predict how 
a court would rule on the question of whether there was a taking.  As a 
general rule, however, courts tend to “focus[] on the economic effect of 
the government regulations and the extent to which they interfere with 
reasonable expectations of the property owner.”178 
In this instance, the issuance of the Net Worth Sweep, in effect, 
removed all economic value of the preferred stockholders’ liquidation 
preference.179  Because the FHFA is liquidating the Companies in a way 
that make the private investors unable to obtain the benefit of their 
bargained-for liquidation rights,180 the liquidation rights are worthless.181  
Therefore, if the Companies are, in fact, put out of business, the 
preferred stockholders should be permitted to obtain the benefit of their 
bargain with the Companies by receiving a liquidation preference 
because the FHFA’s action appears to constitute a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.182 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224–25 (1986) 
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 178. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 146, at 647.  In other words, does the regulation 
leave a “reasonable economically viable use of the property?”  Id. 
 179. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 36, 67 (indicating that the Treasury’s liquidation right is superior to 
those held by the private investors and that the Net Worth Sweep has made privately 
held securities worthless). 
 180. By siphoning off every bit of the Companies’ assets, there will likely be 
nothing upon a final liquidation-based distribution to distribute to the preferred 
stockholders. See Fairholme Funds Fed. Cl. Complaint, supra note 103, ¶ 70.  It is 
worth pointing out that if the stockholders are not given their liquidation preference, the 
Treasury could “receive $189.5 billion as a result of the potential liquidation of the 
Companies.”  See Washington Federal Complaint, supra note 30, ¶ 160. 
 181. See supra note 179. 
 182. See supra notes 172–81 and accompanying text. 
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B. THE CLAIMS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
This Sub-Part discusses the claims that the plaintiff-stockholders of 
the Companies make on grounds provided by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).183  The APA contains the overall framework 
that governs how federal agencies must conduct their affairs.184  It also 
incorporates its own set of review procedures to guide federal courts on 
claims brought pursuant to the APA.185  These procedures include 
various grounds for a reviewing court to use in deciding whether to 
overturn an agency’s action.186  The plaintiffs are likely to prevail 
against both the FHFA and the Treasury on both of the asserted APA 
grounds: (1) exceeding statutory authority and (2) arbitrary and 
capricious action. 
1. Exceeding Statutory Authority 
The APA holds, in pertinent part: “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be . . . (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right.”187  Simply put, “[a]n agency’s 
power is not greater than that delegated to it by Congress.”188  It follows, 
then, that any agency action taken outside of the agency’s statutory grant 
of power is ultra vires189 and should, therefore, be overturned by the 
reviewing court.190 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012). 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. §§ 701–06.   
 186. See id. § 706. 
 187. Id. § 706(2)(C). 
 188. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986). 
 189. “Ultra vires” action is anything that is “[u]nauthorized” or “beyond the scope 
of power allowed or granted . . . by law.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1662 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 190. Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 621 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701, 706(2)(C); WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 66 (8th ed. 1987)). 
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When determining whether an agency action is ultra vires, courts 
must look to the agency’s enabling statute191 and compare “the claimed 
excessive action [against] the pertinent statutory authority.”192  To make 
this comparison, the Chevron test, first set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,193 will most likely be 
implemented.194  The Chevron test is a two-step analysis in which the 
reviewing court must first establish whether “Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”195  “To 
decide whether Congress has addressed the precise question at issue, the 
court analyzes the text, purpose, and structure of the statute.  When the 
statute is not ambiguous, the text controls and no deference is extended 
to the agency’s interpretation in conflict with the text.”196  If, however, 
the statute is ambiguous and does not directly address the issue at hand, 
the court must look to the agency’s action to determine whether it is 
“based on a permissible construction of the statute.”197 
  
                                                                                                                 
 191. See Univ. of D.C. Ass’n/NEA v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance 
Auth., 163 F.3d 616, 620–21 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 192. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 541 F.2d 346, 354 (3d. Cir. 
1976). 
 193. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 194. See id. at 842–43. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 891 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(citing Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S.Ct. 871, 882 (2011); Ranbaxy Labs. 
Ltd. v. Leavitt, 469 F.3d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (citations omitted). 
 197. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  Under the Chevron test, “a court determines the 
level of deference due to the agency’s interpretation of the law it administers.” 
Adirondack, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (citing Mount Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 
477 F.3d 745, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
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a. The FHFA Exceeded Its Statutory Authority: The Exclusivity 
Concept 
On September 7, 2008, the FHFA placed the Companies into 
conservatorship.198  Upon doing so, the FHFA, as the conservator, was 
permitted to take any action “necessary to put the [Companies] in a 
sound and solvent condition.”199  The preferred stockholders contend 
that the Net Worth Sweep is not only outside the scope of the FHFA’s 
authority as conservator but is in direct contravention of the FHFA’s 
responsibilities as conservator of the Companies because the ability to 
wind down the Companies is only available to the FHFA when acting as 
a receiver.200 
Under the Chevron test, the first step is to determine whether 
HERA201 clearly grants the FHFA the authority to enact the Net Worth 
Sweep.202  Upon a plain-meaning interpretation, HERA does appear to 
contain the requisite statutory authority for the FHFA to enter into the 
Net Worth Sweep with the Treasury and to liquidate the Companies.203  
This power, however, may only be exercised if the FHFA is acting as 
the receiver of the Companies.204  If the Companies are only placed in 
conservatorship, which is what then-current FHFA Director James B. 
Lockhart announced in 2008,205 the FHFA was limited to operating and 
preserving the Companies.206  Moreover, the FHFA had stated that the 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
 199. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D) (2012). 
 200. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 79–87; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 84–93.  
Again, it should be reemphasized that the Net Worth Sweep was intended to “wind[] 
down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”  See Treasury 2012 Press Release, supra note 
126. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 103–107. 
 202. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see also supra notes 103–107 and 
accompanying text. 
 203. See 5 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(E). 
 204. See id.  HERA holds that when FHFA “is acting as receiver, [FHFA] shall 
place the regulated entity in liquidation and proceed to realize upon the assets of the 
regulated entity in such manner as [FHFA] deems appropriate.”  Id. 
 205. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 206. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4617(b)(2)(B), (D). 
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Companies were placed in conservatorship, as opposed to 
receivership.207 
Furthermore, in 2011, when the final rules “establishing a 
framework for conservatorship and receivership operations”208 were 
being promulgated under the rulemaking process, the FHFA responded 
to the private-investor shareholders’ concerns regarding the 
conservatorship and receivership frameworks209 by issuing the 
following: 
The ultimate responsibility of FHFA as receiver is to resolve and 
liquidate the existing entity.  A conservator’s goal is to continue the 
operations of a regulated entity, rehabilitate it and return it to a safe, 
sound and solvent condition.  While operating an entity in 
conservatorship, continuation of the mission of the institution and 
fostering liquid, efficient, competitive and resilient national housing 
markets may be in the regulated entity’s best interest, and are 
consistent with the Safety and Soundness Act’s provisions governing 
operating entities.  These activities of a conservator may not be 
aligned with the ultimate duty of a receiver, although in the process 
of finally resolving a regulated entity FHFA will need to strike the 
proper balance between continuing certain operations pending 
liquidation and terminating other operations.  This balance may 
include temporarily operating in support of the failed institution’s 
mission.  FHFA agrees with the [private investors] that some 
activities appropriate in conservatorship are less consistent with a 
receivership.210 
Clearly, then, the FHFA understood that it had available two 
separate arrays of authority under HERA: conservatorship and 
receivership.211 
While some of the powers in these separate arrays of authority 
might not remain exclusively within only one array, some powers must.  
                                                                                                                 
 207. See 76 Fed. Reg. 35,724, 35,724–25 (June 20, 2011). 
 208. Id. at 35,724. 
 209. See id. at 35,730–31.  It should be noted that HERA gave the FHFA the 
authority to place the Companies into receivership and provided a skeletal set of 
guidelines; however, the final rules promulgated by the FHFA developed these base 
rules by expounding upon what Congress had already laid out.  See supra notes 103–
105, 207–208 and accompanying text. 
 210. 76 Fed. Reg. at 35,730. 
 211. See id. 
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In this case, it is wholly inconsistent with the purpose and 
responsibilities of conservatorship to cause the Companies to liquidate 
their assets and begin closing them down.212  This exclusivity concept is 
evidenced in the FHFA’s final rule that sets forth eight separate powers 
that may be exercised by the agency whether it is acting as conservator 
or receiver for the Companies.213  Conversely, the power to liquidate the 
Companies and employ any of the other receivership provisions is 
reserved for when the FHFA is specifically acting as the receiver for the 
Companies.214 
Because this power to liquidate the Companies is reserved only for 
an entity acting as a receiver, it is difficult to perceive how a court 
reviewing the FHFA’s actions in the agency’s role as conservator of the 
Companies would find that the FHFA acted properly in liquidating two 
enterprises that showed strong indications of sustained growth and 
profits.215  Conceivably, a court might find that by instituting the Net 
Worth Sweep, the Companies were being transitioned from 
conservatorship to receivership, which is permitted under the rules.216  
Placing a profitable business into receivership, however, makes little 
economic sense.  Moreover, the transitioning argument could be 
countered by contending that even though the supposed transition to 
receivership is generally permitted under the rules, it would be 
impermissible, as conservator, for the FHFA to place profitable 
enterprises into receivership217 because the FHFA’s goal, as conservator, 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Cf. id.  Under the Federal Regulations, the role of the conservator of the 
Companies is to “rehabilitate [the Companies] and return [them] to a safe, sound and 
solvent condition.”  Id.  Obviously, this is not possible if the Companies are, instead, 
shut down. 
 213. See 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(a), (c) (2013). 
 214. Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3(b) (stating that “[t]he [FHFA], as receiver, shall place 
the [Companies] in liquidation, employing the additional powers expressed in 12 U.S.C. 
4617(b)(2)(E)). 
 215. See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text. 
 216. Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 1237.4 (discussing the accounting of expenses “[i]f a 
receivership immediately succeeds a conservatorship”). 
 217. The profitable Companies’ situations should be contrasted to a failed 
conservatorship.  In other words, once the Companies became profitable under the 
conservatorship, the conservator’s only course of action was to continue the growth and 
profitability until the Companies could be turned back over to the private investors.  
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is “to continue the operations of [the Companies], rehabilitate [them] 
and return [them] to a safe, sound and solvent condition.”218 
Accordingly, by liquidating the Companies, the FHFA strayed from 
its stated responsibilities as conservator, and therefore, acted outside of 
its scope of authority.219  A reviewing court should find that the FHFA 
acted improperly as conservator by engaging in activity that was in 
direct contravention of its role as conservator of the Companies.220 
b. The Treasury Exceeded Its Statutory Authority 
The private investors have initiated a similar complaint against the 
Treasury by arguing that it also exceeded its statutory authority under 
HERA because the Net Worth Sweep modification was made after the 
Treasury’s authority to purchase and modify the Companies’ stock had 
expired.221  The plaintiffs also contend that the Treasury did not properly 
consider the necessary factors before enacting the Net Worth Sweep, 
which also constitutes an unauthorized agency action.222 
Under HERA, the Secretary of the Treasury was permitted to 
“purchase any obligations and other securities issued by the [the 
Companies] under any section of [HERA], on such terms and conditions 
as the Secretary may determine and in such amounts as the Secretary 
may determine.”223  When exercising this authority, the Secretary of the 
                                                                                                                 
Once conservatorship began, the option to transition to a receivership should only be 
available if the conservatorship is failing.  Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 1237.3–.4. 
  It should also be noted that even a mere “contracting” of the Companies is 
arguably impermissible under HERA unless the FHFA can show that is makes good 
business sense to do so.  See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(D) (2012).  Changing the structure 
of the Companies as the FHFA saw fit was not within the purview of HERA.  See 
generally id. 
 218. 76 Fed. Reg. 35,724, 35,730 (June 20, 2011).  
 219. See supra notes 198–214 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 187–214 and accompanying text. 
 221. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 58–68; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 100–
20. 
 222. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 58–68; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 100–
20; see infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 223. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(A), 1455(l)(1)(A) (2012). 
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Treasury must conclude that the Treasury’s actions would: “(i) provide 
stability to the financial markets; (ii) prevent disruptions in the 
availability of mortgage finance; and (iii) protect the taxpayer.”224  In 
determining whether the actions would protect the taxpayers, the 
Secretary of the Treasury must consider the following factors: 
 
(i) The need for preferences or priorities regarding payments to 
the Government; 
(ii) Limits on maturity or disposition of obligations or 
securities to be purchased; 
(iii) The corporation’s plan for the orderly resumption of 
private market funding or capital market access; 
(iv) The probability of the corporation fulfilling the terms of 
any such obligation or other security, including repayment; 
(v)  The need to maintain the corporation’s status as a private 
shareholder-owned company; and 
(vi) Restrictions on the use of corporation resources, including 
limitations on the payment of dividends and executive compensation 
and any such other terms and conditions as appropriate for those 
purposes.225 
 
The Treasury announced its initial PSPA on September 7, 2008.226  
Under this purchase, the Treasury received “senior preferred stock in 
each [of the Companies].”227  The PSPA was amended twice in 2009 to 
increase the amount the Companies could borrow from the Treasury.228  
                                                                                                                 
 224. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(B), 1455(l)(1)(B). 
 225. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(C)(i)-(vi), 1455(l)(1)(C)(i)-(vi) (emphasis added). 
 226. See Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 111, at 30; see also supra notes 108–112 
and accompanying text. 
 227. Treasury Fact Sheet, supra note 111, at 30. 
 228. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, AMENDMENT 
TO AMENDED & RESTATED SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT ¶ 4 (May 
6, 2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23892/ 
FannieMae509Amendment.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & FED. NAT’L MORTG. 
ASS’N, SECOND AMENDMENT TO AMENDED & RESTATED SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT ¶ 3 (Dec. 24, 2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/ 
webfiles/23899/FanniesecondAmendment.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & FED. 
HOME LOAN MORTG. CORP., AMENDMENT TO AMENDED & RESTATED SENIOR 
PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT ¶ 3 (May 6, 2009), available at 
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The Treasury’s authority to enter into or modify these purchases 
statutorily expired on December 31, 2009.229  The Net Worth Sweep, 
however, was not announced until August 17, 2012.230 
First, not all of the Treasury’s authority under the statutes expired 
at the end of 2009.231  Beginning in 2010, the Treasury was effectively 
limited to exercising the rights of and selling off the GPS that it already 
owned.232  Nowhere under the terms of the PSPA or GPS did the 
Treasury have the right to modify the stock that it held to receive all of 
the profits, rather than a simple ten percent dividend, of the Companies 
after 2009.233  Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs correctly contend that 
the Treasury acted outside the boundaries of its power by enacting the 
Net Worth Sweep because after 2009, the Treasury’s stock-purchase 
authority under HERA was limited to selling and exercising the rights of 
the stock it already possessed.234 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23893/FreddieMac509Amendment.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY & FED. HOME LOAN MORTG. CORP., SECOND AMENDMENT TO AMENDED 
& RESTATED SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT ¶ 3 (Dec. 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/ 23901/FreddiesecondAmendment.pdf; see 
also Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 53–54. 
 229. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(4), 1455(l)(4). 
 230. See Fannie Mae Net Worth Sweep, supra note 123, at 1; Freddie Mac Net 
Worth Sweep, supra note 123, at 1. 
 231. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(4), 1455(l)(4). 
 232. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(2), (4), 1455(l)(2), (4).  Additionally, the Treasury 
was still permitted to expend funds to exercise its rights under the GPS.  See 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1719(g)(3)–(4), 1455(l)(3)–(4).  It is worth pointing out that these funding 
subsections, which do survive the 2009 sunset on the Treasury’s authority, also discuss 
“modification” of the previously obtained stock.  See id.  In defending this claim, the 
Treasury may point to this provision as giving them authority to modify the GPS after 
2009.  Doing so, however, would contravene the plain meaning of the subsection, 
which simply states, in pertinent part: “[a]ny funds expended for the purchase of, or 
modifications to, obligations and securities, or the exercise of any rights received in 
connection with such purchases under this subsection shall be deemed appropriated at 
the time of such purchase, modification, or exercise.” 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1719(g)(3), 1455(l)(3).  In other words, this subsection is not granting any additional 
authority to the Treasury.  Rather, it is simply an accounting subsection stating when 
funds should be considered “appropriated.”  See id. 
 233. See generally sources cited supra notes 109, 224–225. 
 234. See supra notes 221–233 and accompanying text. 
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Alternatively, the plaintiffs contend that the Treasury acted beyond 
its statutorily conferred authority because the Treasury, when it entered 
into the Net Worth Sweep, did not appropriately consider the factors 
mandated by HERA235 in order for the Treasury to purchase or modify 
any stock of the Companies.236  The third and fifth elements, which are 
somewhat similar in purpose, are of import here.  They indicate that 
when taking action regarding the stock in the Companies, the Treasury 
must consider that the Companies will eventually return to normal 
operations as privately-owned and privately-operated entities, and the 
FHFA’s actions must further this end.237 
A court reviewing the Treasury’s actions should again apply the 
Chevron test to determine whether the agency’s actions were within the 
statutory scope of authority.238  Accordingly, the court must first 
establish whether the Congressional intent was clear.239  With HERA, it 
is relatively clear that Congress intended that the Companies return to 
private control and ownership once the housing market stabilized and 
the Companies’ cash crises were adverted.240  Because HERA is clear in 
setting forth Congress’s intentions, the Treasury must give it the proper 
effect.  Accordingly, the court should not consider the Treasury’s 
interpretation of the statute because “the court, as well as the [Treasury], 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”241 
The Net Worth Sweep flouts congressional intent by effectively 
discouraging private investment and winding down the Companies’ 
operations.242  Obviously, this is not what Congress intended because it 
directly contravenes the statute.243  It appears, therefore, that the 
Treasury did not properly consider Congress’s intent when it entered 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 58–68; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 100–
20. 
 236. See supra notes 224–225 and accompanying text. 
 237. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(C)(iii), (v), 1455(l)(1)(C)(iii)-(v). 
 238. See supra notes 193–197 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 240. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(C)(iii), (v), 1455(l)(1)(C)(iii)-(v). 
 241. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 242. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. 
 243. Compare sources cited supra note 224 with 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(C)(i)-(vi), 
1455(l)(1)(C)(i)-(vi). 
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into the Net Worth Sweep.  Thus, this action should be overturned as 
exceeding the Treasury’s authority under HERA. 
The Treasury might attempt to counter-argue that when it entered 
into the Net Worth Sweep, the Treasury was, in fact, protecting the 
taxpayers.244  These modifications to wind down the Companies, it 
might contend, benefit the taxpayers by ensuring that the U.S. housing 
market would avoid future housing bubbles.  This argument, however, 
would require ignoring, at least part of, Congress’s intentions, which 
were to return the Companies to private control.245  Whether returning 
the Companies to private control would truly benefit the taxpayers is not 
important because Congress believed it would be beneficial to taxpayers 
and drafted HERA to further that end.246  Therefore, the Treasury was 
bound by Congress’s intent but acted in contravention of it, thereby 
constituting an unauthorized agency action under the agency’s enabling 
statute. 
2. Arbitrary and Capricious Actions 
A court must set aside agency action under the APA if that court 
deems the action to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”247  The “‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency.  Nevertheless, the agency must examine 
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.’”248 
In determining whether an action is arbitrary and capricious, the 
court must decide whether the agency examined the factors that 
                                                                                                                 
 244. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(B)-(C), 1455(l)(1)(B)-(C). 
 245. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(C)(iii), (v), 1455(l)(1)(C)(iii), (v). 
 246. See id. 
 247. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  This is generally known as the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard.  Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 248. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
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Congress intended the agency to rely on before taking action.249  If an 
agency disregards the statutory factors that Congress built into the 
enabling statute, the agency’s action may be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious.250  Moreover, the agency must “provide [a] reasoned 
explanation for its action” to be upheld on review.251  A court is not 
obligated to “defer to [an] agency’s conclusory or unsupported 
suppositions.”252 
a. The FHFA’s Actions Were Arbitrary and Capricious 
The private-investor plaintiffs argue that the FHFA, by entering 
into the Net Worth Sweep, acted arbitrarily and capriciously because the 
agency offered no reasoned explanation for amending the PSPA.253  
According to one of the lawsuits, “[t]here is no public record evidence 
that FHFA engaged in a reasoned decision-making process or 
considered important aspects of the problem it believed it faced.  Nor 
did it establish an evidentiary basis nor provide an adequate explanation 
for its decision.”254  This contention, however, is not entirely correct. 
When the FHFA announced the Net Worth Sweep, it issued a 
simultaneous statement that signaled that the actions were in furtherance 
of the FHFA’s A Strategic Plan for the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, which was previously submitted to Congress.255  The 
                                                                                                                 
 249. See id.  In other words, the agency must demonstrate that “the grounds upon 
which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be 
sustained.”  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
 250. See Minn. Milk Producers Ass’n v. Yeutter, 851 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (D. Minn. 
1994) (finding that the Secretary of Agriculture’s failure to consider the factors set forth 
in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act before deciding on an agricultural price 
structure was arbitrary and capricious). 
 251. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
 252. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 
1186–87 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43). 
 253. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 88–94; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 94–99. 
 254. Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 96. 
 255. See Statement, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Acting Director 
Edward J. DeMarco on Changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Preferred Stock 
Purchase Agreements (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://www.fhfa. gov/webfiles/ 
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complication, however, of relying upon this plan as “evidencing” well-
reasoned action is that the plan appears to be, at least partially, outside 
of the FHFA’s scope of authority.  This is because a primary tenet of the 
plan is to “[g]radually contract the [Companies’] dominant presence in 
the marketplace while simplifying and shrinking their operations.”256  
Contracting the Companies’ presence and shrinking their operations, 
however, is not part of the FHFA’s scope of authority in its role as 
conservator of the Companies.257  Unless the FHFA can show evidence 
that scaling the Companies back was necessary for their continued 
existence in the marketplace, these FHFA actions are not part of the 
conservator’s powers.258  As such, the FHFA should not be permitted to 
rely on this plan as evidence to support their decision to implement the 
Net Worth Sweep.259 
It appears that, at least in some ways, the FHFA’s decision to act 
was arbitrary and capricious because the agency put forth insufficient 
evidence to support its decision.260  Moreover, the “evidence” that was 
put forth was, at least in part, impermissible for the agency to rely upon 
because reducing the size of the Companies was not within the FHFA’s 
purview of power when acting as conservator.261  Therefore, the FHFA’s 
actions must be overturned, and the investors should be compensated for 
any losses incurred. 
                                                                                                                 
24203/FINAL_FHFA_PSPA_8172012.pdf (referencing A Strategic Plan for the 
Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY (Feb. 
21, 2012) [hereinafter Strategic Plan]). 
 256. Strategic Plan, supra note 255, at 2. 
 257. See supra notes 210–214 and accompanying text.  As previously discussed, the 
FHFA, as conservator, is operating under a limited set of powers.  See id. 
 258. See supra notes 249–250 and accompanying text. 
 259. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that “an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider”). 
 260. See supra notes 249–256 and accompanying text. 
 261. See id.  
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b. The Treasury’s Actions Were Arbitrary and Capricious 
The plaintiff-investors have lodged a similar arbitrary-and-
capricious claim against the Treasury262 and pointed to the statute that 
authorized the Treasury to purchase the GPS in the Companies.263  
Again, prior to entering into these purchases and, presumably, before 
making any modifications thereto,264 the Treasury had to consider 
whether its action would “protect the taxpayer” and “maintain the 
[Companies’] status as . . . private shareholder-owned compan[ies].”265   
Because the Treasury failed to sufficiently consider these factors, it 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, so its action must be overturned. 
An agency action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency “failed to consider mandatory factors set forth by statute.”266  In 
the present case of the Treasury’s action, when Congress enacted the 
relevant statute, Congress insisted that the Treasury “must determine” 
that the GPS purchases and their modifications “are necessary to . . . 
protect the taxpayer.”267  Furthermore, in determining whether 
purchasing the GPS would “protect the taxpayer,” the Treasury “shall 
take into consideration” the plan to return the Companies to private 
funding and private stockholder ownership.268 
From a plain-meaning interpretation of the statute, the factors set 
forth by Congress are clearly not optional proposals.269  Rather, all of the 
                                                                                                                 
 262. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶¶ 69–89; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 111–
20. 
 263. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶ 71; Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 113. 
 264. Cf. Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 114 (stating that if the 
statutes regulating the Treasury did not apply to modifications, as well as initial 
purchases, the “Treasury could fundamentally alter its investments in the Companies at 
any time, including after its investment authority has expired, without making the 
required determinations or considering the necessary factors”). 
 265. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(C)(iii), (v), 1455(l)(1)(C)(iii), (v) (2012). 
 266. NRDC v. EPA, 638 F.3d 1183, 1190 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing NRDC v. EPA, 
526 F.3d 591, 602 (9th Cir. 2008); Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1422 (9th Cir. 
1987)). 
 267. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(B)(iii), 1455(l)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). 
 268. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1719(g)(1)(C)(iii), (v), 1455(l)(1)(C)(iii), (v) (emphasis added). 
 269. See supra notes 264–268. 
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statutory factors are mandatory considerations for the Treasury to 
analyze and abide by when undertaking the purchase and modification 
of the GPS.270  Clearly, the Treasury did not do so here because it is 
impossible to reconcile shrinking, liquidating, or preventing the 
Companies from retaining profits with Congress’s mandate that the 
Companies should ultimately be returned to private ownership via 
private funding.271  Because the Treasury failed to consider Congress’s 
required factors before modifying the GPS, the Treasury’s actions were 
arbitrary and capricious.  Therefore, its actions must be overturned, and 
the investors should receive compensation for their losses. 
C. BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST THE FHFA AS CONSERVATOR FOR 
THE COMPANIES 
The private investors also contend that the FHFA, as conservator of 
the Companies, breached the stockholders’ contractual rights under the 
terms of the preferred stock certificates.272  The plaintiffs argue that by 
enacting the Net Worth Sweep, the FHFA, in acting for the Companies, 
“breached [the Companies’] obligations to [the] Plaintiffs by nullifying 
entirely the contractual rights of”273 the private stockholders to receive a 
“specified, noncumulative dividend and . . . a contractually specified 
liquidation preference.”274  Although this is a state law claim, it is not 
necessary to separately analyze the claims against Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac because Virginia and Delaware contain extremely similar 
elements for breach-of-contract claims.275 
Under Delaware state law, the following elements must be shown 
for a breach of contract claim: “(1) a contractual obligation; (2) a breach 
of that obligation by the defendant; and (3) resulting damage to the 
                                                                                                                 
 270. See id. 
 271. Cf. id. 
 272. See Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 121–128. 
 273. Id. ¶ 123. 
 274. Id. ¶ 122. 
 275. As stated above, Delaware law should govern any state law claims against 
Fannie Mae while Virginia law would be applicable to these claims against Freddie 
Mac. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶ 75. 
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plaintiffs.”276  Similarly, to establish a prima facie breach-of-contract 
claim in Virginia, the plaintiffs must prove: “(1) a legally enforceable 
obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s violation or 
breach of that obligation; and (3) injury or damage to the plaintiff 
caused by the breach of obligation.”277  Essentially, both of these state 
laws consist of an obligation, a failure to comply with that obligation, 
and a measurable level of damages.278 
First, the plaintiffs contend that they were contractually obligated to 
receive dividends and certain liquidation rights upon dissolution,279 
which, if true, would seem to satisfy the initial element of the breach of 
contract test.280  This contention, however, appears to overlook the fact 
that the plaintiffs’ right to receive dividend payments is completely 
contingent upon the decisions of the Companies’ Boards of Directors to 
make such a distribution, and if a dividend is not paid in a given year, 
the obligation does not accumulate in subsequent years.281  Therefore, a 
private stockholder has only the contractual right to receive dividend 
payments if and only if the Boards declare a dividend.282  Until this event 
occurs, the right to receive the payment does not materialize.283  Because 
there was no contractual obligation to pay dividends, there can be no 
breach.  Finally, even if there were an obligation and a breach thereof, a 
court would likely find that because it is impossible to determine if, how 
often, or when the Boards would declare dividends in the future, the 
damages would be too speculative to award any compensation.284 
Arguably, however, the plaintiffs’ contractual right to receive a 
certain liquidation preference does currently exist because the FHFA 
                                                                                                                 
 276. Greenstar, LLC v. Heller, Civ. No. 10-746-SLR, 2013 WL 1285420, at *11 (D. 
Del. Mar. 28, 2013) (citing WaveDivision Holdings, LLC v. Millennium Digital Media 
Sys., LLC, Civ. No. 2993, 2010 WL 3706624, at *13 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2010)). 
 277. Sunrise Continuing Care, LLC v. Wright, 671 S.E. 2d 132, 135 (Va. 2009). 
 278. See supra notes 276–277. 
 279. See Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 122–23. 
 280. Compare id. with supra note 276. 
 281. See supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text. 
 282. See id. 
 283. Cf. id. 
 284. See Sunrise Continuing Care, 671 S.E. 2d at 135; Wise v. W. Union Tele. Co., 
181 A. 302, 303 (Del. 1935) (indicating that a plaintiff cannot recover damages that are 
“remote, speculative and contingent”). 
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made clear that it intended to shut the Companies down.285  
Unfortunately for the private stockholders there does not appear to be 
any breach of this contractual obligation either because the liquidation 
provisions of the Companies’ preferred stock state that these 
stockholders have a preference over common stockholders and any other 
stock that ranks junior to the preferred stockholders.286  No one has 
insisted that junior stockholders would be paid out upon dissolution 
before the preferred stockholders because the stockholders that are 
senior to the preferred stockholders would receive the preferential 
treatment.287  In other words, because no shareholders that are junior to 
the preferred stockholders will receive a liquidation distribution before 
the preferred stockholders, these provisions in the stock certificates have 
not been violated.288  Therefore, under a plain-meaning reading of the 
stock certificates, there has been no breach of the plaintiffs’ liquidation 
rights, so this claim must fail.289 
D. BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING AGAINST THE FHFA 
Some of the plaintiff-investors have raised a second claim based on 
contract theory, asserting that the FHFA breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing that is “[i]mplicit in every contract.”290  Because 
                                                                                                                 
 285. See Treasury 2012 Press Release, supra note 126.  The stockholders’ 
liquidation rights are triggered if there is a “voluntary or involuntary dissolution, 
liquidation or winding up of” the Companies.   Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, 
supra note 15, ¶¶ 36–37. 
 286. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 36–37. 
 287. Cf. id.; Paulson, supra note 110. 
 288. Cf. Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 43; Paulson, supra 
note 110. 
 289. It should be possible to more accurately determine the amount of damages here 
by simply subtracting the outstanding balance due the Treasury under the PSPA from 
the net assets of the Companies, which should yield the amount of damage to the 
plaintiffs; however, the failure of the plaintiffs to meet the “breach” element renders 
this analysis moot. 
 290. Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 129–35. 
Although every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between 
the parties to it, the jurisdictions are divided on whether a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing is an independent source of duties 
2014] ARE THE FEDS FORCING FANNIE AND FREDDIE  535 
INTO RETIREMENT? 
  
contract claims are grounded in state law, it is necessary to turn to 
Virginia and Delaware contract law.291 
1. Breach of the Implied Covenant Against Fannie Mae 
Pursuant to Delaware contract law, “an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inheres in every contract.”292  This covenant 
requires each contracting party to “act reasonably upon contractual 
language that is on its face reasonable”293 and is used to protect the 
“spirit” of the contract when one party uses “oppressive or underhanded 
tactics to deny the other side the fruits of the parties’ bargain.”294  
Importantly, however, the reviewing court is not permitted to use this 
doctrine to contravene the terms of the original contract or go beyond its 
initial scope.295  Accordingly, if the parties specifically spoke to a 
                                                                                                                 
assumed by the parties.  In some jurisdictions, a breach of such 
covenant does not, by itself, create a cause of action, while in others 
a breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing does create a 
cause of action. . . . In some jurisdictions, a breach of such covenant 
does not, by itself, create a cause of action.  A claim for breach of 
good faith and fair dealing is, in such jurisdictions, nothing more 
than a breach of a contract claim and is analyzed like a claim for the 
breach of any other contractual duty.  Thus, a claim for breach of an 
implied duty of good faith is duplicative of a breach of contract 
claim. 
17B C.J.S. Contracts § 826 (2011). 
 291. See Perry Capital Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 109, ¶ 75. 
 292. Chamison v. Healthtrust, Inc., 735 A.2d 912, 920 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 293. Id.  To prevail on this issue, the claimant must show that the defending-party 
acted “arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Nemic v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Del. 
2010).  Additionally, a plaintiff must satisfy the following elements: “[1] a specific 
implied contractual obligation, [2] a breach of that obligation by the defendant, and [3] 
resulting damage to the plaintiff.” Kelly v. Blum, No. C.A. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 
629850, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Cantor, No. C.A. 16297-
NC, 1998 WL 842316, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1998)). 
 294. Chamison, 735 A.2d at 920.  This implied covenant generally cannot be waived 
by contracting parties.  E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17 (4th ed. 2004). 
 295. See Chamison, 735 A.2d at 921.  “[T]he covenant [of good faith and fair 
dealing] is a limited and extraordinary legal remedy.”  Nemic, 991 A.2d at 1128. 
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particular issue, the court may not rewrite the contract to give one of the 
parties a better bargain.296 
At first blush, this appears to be a cogent claim because the 
plaintiffs were certainly denied the “fruits of [their] bargain.”297  Due to 
the Net Worth Sweep, the Treasury will now begin hoarding all of 
Fannie Mae’s profits, thereby preventing the plaintiffs from obtaining 
their contracted-for dividends.298  From the investors’ point of view, this 
could certainly be viewed as arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, and 
underhanded.299 
The biggest obstacle in the plaintiffs’ path, however, is that 
arguably, this situation is expressly covered by the provisions of the 
Companies’ stock, which provides that the private stockholders are only 
entitled to a dividend if and when declared by the Fannie Mae Board of 
Directors.300  This would impair the plaintiffs’ case because express 
provisions cannot constitute an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.301  Moreover, the stock gives the Board sole discretion over 
whether a dividend should be declared.302  Therefore, a reviewing court, 
when applying Delaware law, could find that because the stock terms 
spoke to the issue by specifically granting sole discretion to the Board 
(or in this case, the FHFA acting on behalf of the Board), it is not a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to take 
action that would not declare a dividend.303 
2. Breach of the Implied Covenant Against Freddie Mac 
This claim appears to be even more black-and-white under Virginia 
law because “Virginia law does not recognize a claim for breach of a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Virginia Circuit courts that 
                                                                                                                 
 296. See Nemic, 991 A.2d at 112–26; Chamison, 735 A.2d at 921. 
 297. Cf. Chamison, 735 A.2d at 920. 
 298. See supra notes 122–126 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Chamison, 735 A.2d at 920. 
 300. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 36. 
 301. See Kelly v. Blum, No. C.A. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *13 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 24, 2010) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Cantor, 1998 WL 842316, at *1) (explaining that 
the first element of the claim requires “a specific implied contractual obligation”) 
(emphasis added). 
 302. See Cacciapalle Class Action Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 36. 
 303. See supra notes 292–302 and accompanying text. 
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have considered such claims have consistently rejected them.”304  
Therefore, if the reviewing court applies Virginia law to the Freddie 
Mac stock, this claim should fail.305 
E. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Finally, the investors also raise a claim against the FHFA for 
breach of fiduciary duty, namely a duty of loyalty, to the stockholders in 
its role as conservator of the Companies.306  This type of claim lies 
within the purview of state law, but the laws of Delaware and Virginia 
appear to be similar enough to be analyzed together. 
Given Delaware’s rich history of corporate cases, the Delaware 
courts have been able to thoroughly examine the duty of loyalty to the 
corporation and its shareholders. 
The relationship between a corporation and its preferred 
stockholders is “primarily . . . contractual in nature,” involving “rights 
and obligations created contractually by the certificate of designation.”  
On the other hand, fiduciary duties as well may be owed to preferred 
stockholders in limited circumstances.  A corporation’s directors “are 
fiduciaries for the [p]referred stockholders, whose interests they have a 
duty to safeguard, consistent with the fiduciary duties owed by those 
                                                                                                                 
 304. Spiller v. James River Corp., No. LW-2216-3, 1993 WL 946387, at *6 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993); see also Sneed v. Am. Bank Stationary Co., 764 F. Supp. 65, 
67 (W.D. Va. 1991) (stating that “the cause of action [for breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing] is not recognized under Virginia law”). 
 305. See supra note 304. 
 306. See Fairholme Funds D.D.C Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 136–45. 
Majority, dominant, or controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty 
to the minority shareholders, as well as to the other majority 
shareholders and the corporation, and where a majority or 
controlling shareholder is also a director, then fiduciary duties apply 
in both capacities.  The applicable standard or test is that of intrinsic 
or inherent fairness.  In any event, the majority stockholders have a 
real duty to protect the interests of the minority in the management 
of the corporation, especially where they undertake to run the 
corporation without giving the minority a voice in it. 
18A AM. JUR 2D Corporations § 644 (2004). 
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directors to [the corporation’s] other shareholders and to [the 
corporation] itself.”307 
This duty to safeguard the shareholders and the corporation trumps 
a director’s, officer’s, or controlling shareholder’s own interest that 
would not benefit the “stockholders generally.”308  Furthermore, the 
“Delaware courts have not hesitated to state that a fiduciary duty of 
loyalty is one such right shared equally between the common and 
preferred stockholders.”309  It should follow, then, that the FHFA, in 
acting as Fannie Mae’s controlling entity, owes an equal duty of loyalty 
to the holders of the GPS, the preferred stock, the common stock, and 
the company itself.310 
Virginia corporate law is relatively similar to Delaware’s with 
respect to the duty of loyalty owed to the shareholders of a corporation.  
“It is well-settled that ‘[a] Virginia corporation’s directors and officers 
owe a duty of loyalty both to the corporation and to the corporation’s 
                                                                                                                 
 307. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377, 386 (Del Ch. 1999) 
(quoting HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at 
*9 (Del Ch. June 9, 1993) (alterations in original); Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee 
Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1062 (Del. Ch. 1987)). 
 308. See Carsonaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc. 65 A.3d 618, 637 (Del. Ch. 2013).  
This may be termed the “entirely fairness standard.”  Id. at 637–38.  This exacting rule 
requires of 
a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most 
scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect 
the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to 
refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the 
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill 
and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the 
reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.  The rule that requires 
an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that 
there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.  The 
occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal 
conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be 
formulated.  The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale. 
Id. (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). 
 309. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins., 741 A.2d at 387. 
 310. Cf. supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text. 
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shareholders.’”311  In all transactions that affect the corporation or its 
shareholders, it is impermissible for a director to gain “any personal 
advantage . . . or make any profit for himself”312 and the director must 
take steps to “guard the interests of the corporation.”313 
When looking at the effects of the Net Worth Sweep, it does not 
appear to be an entirely fair transaction for the stockholders as a whole.  
This presumably final amendment to the PSPA greatly benefits the 
Treasury, as the holder of the senior GPS, to the detriment of the 
preferred and common stockholders.314  The FHFA arguably used its 
position as the Companies’ controlling entity to broker a deal with a 
sister federal agency to amend the terms of the GPS that would be 
mutually beneficial while squeezing out all of the private 
stockholders.315  Using one’s position as a director for gain at the 
expense of the shareholders is impermissible under Delaware and 
Virginia corporate law.316  The FHFA’s actions fly in the face of this 
straightforward rule and should, therefore, be struck down as a violation 
                                                                                                                 
 311. Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623 (E.D. Va. 1999) (quoting WLR 
Foods v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 419, 421 (W.D. Va. 1994) (alteration in 
original)). 
 312. Id. (quoting Rowland v. Kable, 6 S.E. 2d 633, 642 (Va. 1940)). 
 313. Cf. id. (quoting Rowland, 6 S.E. 2d at 642).  The Code of Virginia also states 
that “[a] director shall discharge his duties as a director . . . in accordance with his good 
faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation.” VA. CODE ANN.  
§ 13.1-690 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 314. Cf. sources cited supra note 122–126 and accompanying text. 
 315. Initially, it looks as if the FHFA is “throwing out the baby with the bath water” 
by shutting down two major profit centers in the housing market.  It appears, however, 
the FHFA’s motives are largely political in nature because roughly a year after the 
announcement of the Net Worth Sweep, President Barack Obama gave a speech 
indicating that he wishes to see the Companies shut down.  See Obama to Urge 
Congress in Speech to Shutter Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FOX NEWS (Aug. 6, 
2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/08/06/obama-to-urge-congress-in-
speech-to-shutter-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac/; see also U.S. Housing Regulator Files 
Paperwork for New Securitization Firm, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2013) (stating that “the 
regulator overseeing . . . Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . . . said it filed legal paperwork 
to create a common platform for the two firms to issue mortgage-backed securities . . . 
called the Common Securitization Solutions, LLC[, which will] consolidate some of 
functions [sic] currently replicated by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac”). 
 316. See supra notes 307–313 and accompanying text. 
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of its fiduciary duties to the preferred and common stockholders and 
entitle the plaintiffs to compensation.317 
V. THE GOVERNMENT ANSWERS THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
Since the inception of this Article, the Federal Government has 
responded to only the aforementioned Fifth Amendment claims.318  In its 
motion to dismiss, the United States replied with a litany of procedural 
maneuvers to have at least one of the cases thrown out.319  Some of these 
procedural claims, such as the contention that the only party that has 
standing to sue the FHFA is the FHFA itself,320 are quite unique and 
interesting.  In addition to procedural grounds, the defendant also raises 
some of the substantive arguments (or variations thereof) set forth above 
regarding the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause 
to the seizure of the dividend payments.321 
CONCLUSION 
The private investors’ angered reaction to the Net Worth Sweep is 
definitely a rational one.  These individual and corporate investors 
purchased stock in the Companies with an expectation of, inter alia, 
dividends.  Although the declaration of dividends is subject to the 
Boards’ sole discretion, a reasonable, prudent investor would not expect 
the Companies to abruptly change their business strategies so that no 
dividends would ever be issued again.  Though the Companies are 
government-chartered, they have been transitioned to private ownership 
                                                                                                                 
 317. See supra notes 307–316. 
 318. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Wash. Fed. v. United States, No. 13-385C 
(Fed. Cl. Nov. 7, 2013). 
 319. See id. at 11–22. 
 320. See id. at 18–19. 
 321. See id. at 22–31; see also supra notes 141–171.  For an interesting analysis of 
the defendant’s motion that takes a contradictory viewpoint than that espoused in this 
Article, see Richard Epstein’s blog entry on the topic.  Richard A. Epstein, An 
Unconstitutional Bonanza, DEFINING IDEAS (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/ defining-ideas/article/161456. 
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and control.322  The housing market crash should not have permanently 
affected this structure. 
Moreover, if the Companies now need to be shut down or 
completely restructured, this author wonders why the federal 
government bothered infusing the Companies with so much capital after 
the housing crash.  If the public-private hybrid structure is so incredibly 
flawed that the Companies must now liquidate or rebuild from the 
ground up, why not just avoid this litigation altogether by letting the 
Companies fail in 2008?  It is strange to spend so many taxpayer dollars 
to bail out two entities that will ultimately be shut down soon after 
returning them to profitability.323 
In any event, this is the path that the government started upon, and 
the lawsuits discussed herein are the result.  Though some of the 
investor-plaintiffs’ claims appear to be doomed from the outset, some 
should be able to prevail, resulting in the reversal of the FHFA’s and 
Treasury’s Net Worth Sweep.324 
 
                                                                                                                 
 322. See supra notes 14, 29 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 114, 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 324. See generally discussion supra Part IV. 
